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<COOlP'ERATIVJE JFAJDL10Jlm: AN ANALYSIS
OJFINTERGOVERNMENTAL
mEJLATIONSHIPS AND THE
lP'JR<OJBJLEM OF AIR
<QUAJLJ[TI[ NONa.A'ITAINMENT
RONALD H. ROSENBERG¢

INTRODUCTION
An increasing awareness and concern for matters of environmental quality has led to greater social pressure for environmental protection. Although many pressing public issues compete for
our collective attention, the subject of air pollution and its control
appears near the top of the list. Despite this high level of public
interest and support, air pollution remains a serious social problem which affects millions of Americans.
Over the last twenty years, Congress has established air pollution abatement as a national priority. To achieve this objective,
the Clean Air Act sets forth the national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") to protect public health and welfare. 1 In order
to accomplish this public health purpose, Congress created a system of air quality regulation that allocates discrete planning, regulatory and enforcement functions to both federal and state levels
of government. Moreover, this functional distribution has been
made for political as well as practical reasons. What is most significant is that the Clean Air Act has set forth a complex environmental policy goal to be achieved through a planning and
regulatory system relying upon intergovernmental cooperation.
Although the attainment of health-protecting air quality standards might be congressionally supported as a national goal, its
actual achievement often has been perceived as imposing serious
burdens upon local industries and interfering with the transportation choices of individuals and state and local governments.2 As
such, the Clean Air Act's air quality attainment goals could con-

* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of law, College of William and
Mary.
1. See Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988).
2. See, e.g., Crow & Williams, U.S. Refiners Facing Squeeze Under New
Federal, State Air Quality Rules, Oil & Gasj.,jan. 23, 1989 at 281 (lead industry
would be harmed by air quality regulations).
13
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flict with other significant values held by state and local government and by individual citizens. The divergence in interests
between levels of government might affect the nature of state and
local government participation in the federal scheme of air quality
control. This Article focuses on the design of an intergovernmental planning and regulatory system in which the participants
do not, or may not, share the same desire to achieve the national
environmental objectives.
For over thirty years, Congress has identified air quality as a
legitimate federal concern. The body oflaw that has arisen represents a complex area of governmental regulation involving all
three branches of government. In 1990, after thirteen years,
Congress finally amended the Clean Air Act, the nation's primary
air pollution law. 3 This complex set of amendments represents
the most recent legislative expression of national air pollution
policy. In adopting this new law, Congress has adopted provisions which will alter the path of environmental policy development in a myriad of significant ways. More importantly, this
statute sets the course for the 1990s and will likely be the federal
air pollution law of the next century.
This Article addresses several fundamental and related questions: what has been the intergovernmental structure of the system of air pollution control established under federal law? How
have the relationships between federal and non-federal levels of
government changed during the twenty-year development of the
Clean Air Act? To what extent is the continuing problem of
NAAQS non-attainment affected by the structure of air quality
planning, regulation, and enforcement established under the
Clean Air Act? Has the adoption of the 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments (" 1990 Act") resulted in the improvement of intergovernmental relationships, making NAAQS attainment and
maintenance more likely in the future?
This Article concludes that universal NAAQS attainment remains a fundamental yet elusive public policy objective. Moreover, it argues that intergovernmental relationships defined by
the Act have evolved under the changing framework of federal air
pollution law. While retaining the basic structure of intergovernmental relationships, the 1990 Act has established a highly-defined air quality planning and regulatory program with clearer
operational provisions. In the end the success or failure of the
3. Clean Air Act Amendments of I990, Pub. L. No. I 0 I-549, I 04 Stat. 2399
(1990) [hereinafter I990 Act].
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Act in reaching attainment depends substantially upon the continued commitment of state and local government and a high degree
of popular support. The future role of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in this cooperative enterprise will be to motivate and encourage state participation in a congressionally
specified system of air pollution control.
I

THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL AIR POLLUTION
LAW AND POLICY: 1955 TO 1970
Emerging Federal Interest.-After World War II, state government took the lead in developing legal responses to the emerging
problem of air pollution.4 However, limitations inherent in the
size and reach of individual state governments restricted the potential for developing an effective system of state-centered air
pollution control. 5 Restricted geographical jurisdiction, inadequate resources and expertise, and conflicting state regulatory interests limited the potential effectiveness of the state approach to
air pollution control. 6 Although air pollution was widely considered a public health and aesthetic menace, no unified or national
concept of unacceptable pollution yet existed.7 Consequently,
the non-attainment issue had not yet arisen. During the 1950s
and 1960s, congressional action began to define a federal interest
in air pollution control. This emerging federal interest and resultant body of law predominated after 1970, when federal law developed the idea of a national air quality standard.
The 1955 Act.-Over a thirty-five year history, federal air pollution law has grown immensely in its scope and complexity. This
statutory evolution has been accompanied by a series of changes
in the relationship between federal and state governments in the
area of air pollution control. This section describes the development of federal air pollution legislation from 1955 through 1970,
giving special attention to matters of intergovernmental
relationships.
As the states' interest in air pollution grew during the 1950s,
Congress moved slowly to enact legislation in the field. In 1955,
Congress passed a statute authorizing the Surgeon General to
4. See, e.g., Cowan, Air Pollution Control in New Jersey, 9 Rutgers L. Rev.
609, 631 (1954).
5. See Note, State Common Law Actions and Federal Pollution Control
Statutes: Can They Work Together?, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 609, 620.
6. See id.
7. See Cowan, supra note 4, at 631-32.
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fund or to undertake research into air pollution abatement and to
disseminate such results to state and local air pollution control
agencies.s Furthermore, in an effort to carry out the mandate,
this two page statute authorized an appropriation of up to five
million dollars per year for five years to fund research, training,
and demonstration projects. 9 With this modest start, the federal
government entered the field of air pollution, viewing it as a suitable subject of study for public health purposes. 10
In this early statute, Congress emphasized the secondary and
supportive role that the federal government was to play with the
states in the battle against air pollution. The preamble of the
1955 Act stated that the main congressional policy was "to preserve and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the
States and local governments in controlling air pollution .... " 11
Following the pattern of the prior seventy-five years, and despite its provision for financial and technical assistance, Congress
took great pains to acknowledge the primacy of state and local
governments and the limited aspirations of the federal government. Specifically, it continued to consider air pollution as a public health matter principally oflocal concern and one for which no
national policy was necessary. The idea of federal intervention
through the actions of a regulatory agency was not yet an alternative to local control. 12 The 1955 Act represented a modest, nonregulatory effort to involve the federal health agency in the study
of the air pollution problem. The law would begin to change in
the 1960s.
The Clean Air Act of 1963 .-In 1963, Congress returned to the
subject of air pollution control when it enacted the first statute
entitled the "Clean Air Act." 13 The 1963 law added to the preexisting components of the 1955 Act, but it also began to develop
a distinctly federal character to the emerging program. While
providing funding at a level nearly six times that of the prior Act's
8. See Act of july 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
9. Id. § 5(a), 69 Stat. at 322-23.
10. Id., 69 Stat. at 322.
II. Id., 69 Stat. at 322.
12. The Senate Report on what eventually became the 1955 Act stated
flatly: "[t]he committee recognizes that it is the primary responsibility of State
and local governments to prevent air pollution. The bill docs not propose any
exercise of police power by the Federal Government and no provision in it invades the sovereignty of States, counties, or cities. There is no attempt to impose standards of purity." S. Rep. No 389, 84th Cong., 1st Scss. at 351 (1955),
reprinted in 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 2457, 2459.
13. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
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authorization, the 1963 Clean Air Act also emphasized the creation of a national air pollution research and development program that did not merely respond to local requests for
information. Rather, as part of this federal research function, the
statute specifically charged the United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") with the responsibility
for compiling and publishing documents known as air pollution
criteria. 14 These criteria were intended to reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of health
and welfare effects resulting from the exposure to air pollutants. 15
With the development of these air pollution criteria documents,
the nature of the federal role in air pollution control began to
change. Instead of providing research support, the federal government became responsible for administrative standard-setting.
The air quality criteria would later become the basis for setting
the NAAQ') under the 1970 Clean Air Act.16
The 1963 Act also was significant for its establishment of the
federal policy of providing direct funding for state and local air
pollution control agencies. 17 While this financial support aided
the creation of sub-federal anti-pollution agencies, it also initiated
a pattern of state dependence on programmatic funding. This
form of federal funding continues today. With the expansion of
the federal role in sponsoring air pollution control agencies, Congress moved the federal government into a position of challenging the previously state- and local-dominated system of pollution
abatement.
Although reluctant in 1955 to intrude into the states' sovereignty over pollution control, Congress found it possible in 1963
to create a procedure for federal abatement ofinterstate air pollution. The idea that the federal government could abate interstate
public nuisances was not new, 1s but the 1963 statute established
the federal government as the more important actor in the process of pollution control. While this abatement procedure proved
largely unworkable in practice, 19 it did represent a novel view that
14. Id. at § 3(c}(2), 77 Stat. at 395.
15. Id.
16. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
17. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 3(b)(3), 77 Stat. 392, 394 (1963).
18. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
19. See D. Currie, Air Pollution-Federal law and Analysis 1-12 to 1-14
(1981); see, e.g., United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624
(D. Md. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970);
Edelman, Federal Air and Water Pollution Control: The Application of the
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air pollution problems had a greater than local significance and
that the federal government had a legitimate role in resolving interstate air pollution disputes. Finally, although the 1963 Act
granted no direct federal regulatory authority, it did extend federal administrative activity in the field, and it also established a
more aggressive function for HEW in enforcing the emerging environmentallaw.2o The recognition of state interests in the control of air pollution would not be directly addressed until 1970.
The Air Quality Act of 1967 .-The next step in the development of federal air pollution control legislation was the passage
of the 1967 Air Quality Act. 21 This statute introduced a number
of fundamental organizational concepts which would remain with
the federal air pollution control program well beyond 1967.
First, the Act required HEW to establish "atmospheric areas"
that shared a common climate, topography, and meteorology. 22
Within these areas, HEW was directed to define "air quality control regions" ("AQCR") which would be used for imposing air
quality standards. 23 Second, the federal agency was then to issue
"criteria of air quality" and reports on "pollution control techniques" setting forth the most current information on those topics. 24 Third, each state was mandated to designate ambient air
quality standards consistent with the criteria and control techniques for each AQCR within its borders. 25 Finally, the 1967 Act
obligated each state to prepare an implementation plan to set
emission standards and compliance schedules for specific sources
within its borders. 26
In sum, the 1967 scheme of air quality planning and regulation vested considerable authority in each state with loose federal
supervision and little direct control. Although the 1967 Act provided a number of organizing principles that would be carried
over into subsequent federal legislation, it represented the last
vestige of state autonomy in the control of air pollution. And
even though the Act soon would be superseded by the compreCommerce Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1067 (1965).
20. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 8, 77 Stat. at 400.
21. Air Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
22. Id. § 107(a)(l), 81 Stat. at 490.
23. Id. § 107(a)(2), 81 Stat. at 490-91.
24. Id. §§ 107(b), (c), 81 Stat. at 491.
25. Id. § 108(c)(l), 81 Stat. at 492.
26. Id. § 108(c)(2), 81 Stat. at 492.
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hensive 1970 statute, it provided the foundation for the future
federal-state relationship in air quality planning and enforcement.
III
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970
A.

Foundation

of

Change The Clean Air Amendments of

1970 ("1970 Act") was the first comprehensive federal regulatory statute concerned with environmental quality to be enacted.
Its passage came at a time of great social concern about environmental matters.28 For example, it followed Earth Day, an event
that focused the nation's attention on matters of environmental
quality, 29 by approximately six months. The general societal interest in environmental issues manifested itself in a political way
at the national level. Within a period of two years, Congress actively considered and enacted a number of sweeping environmental bills, including the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
("NEPA"),30 the 1970 Act31 and the Federal '\Vater Pollution
Control Act. 32 Why was this federal legislative and administrative
effort necessary? Within the field of air pollution control, congressional leaders thought the 1967 Air Quality Act inadequate to
the task and its own prior implementation "regrettably slow."33
In addition, the 1970 Act reflected a fundamental change in the
federal view of the states' capacity to cure air pollution on an individual basis. Heavy reliance upon the efforts of state and local
governments seemed misplaced because these entities often
27

27. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
28. The political rhetoric of the time described the nation as facing a serious air pollution crisis imposing costs of as much as 38 billion dollars per year in
environmentally induced diseases. A recurring opinion expressed during the
development of the 1970 Act was that population growth, industrial production,
and rising affiuence had a substantial affect on the intolerable air quality conditions of many urban areas. Thus, Senator Edmund Muskie, the Senate sponsor
of the bill, noted in the conference report:
[W]e learned that air pollution is more severe, more pervasive and gro\\ing
faster than we had thought. Unless we recognized the crisis and generated a
sense of urgency, national lead times to find and apply control measures
could melt away without any chance for a rational solution to the air pollution problem.
116 Cong. Rec. 42,382 (1970).
29. See Lewis, The Spirit of the First Earth Day, 16 EPA Journal 8 ijan./
Feb. 1990).
30. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
31. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
32. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970).
33. H.R. Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5356, 5360 (1970).
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lacked the expertise, resources, and desire to regulate air polluting sources stringently.
Furthermore, the enactment of the main federal anti-pollution laws indicated an understanding that air and water pollution
problems should be approached in a uniform and scientifically
based fashion that was not limited by the artificial boundaries of
states. Air was perceived as a natural resource which moved according to natural forces and respected no political boundaries.
These environmental problems were transformed into national
dilemmas requiring national solutions. The Clean Air Act not
only reflected the national interest in the subject of air pollution,
but also it allocated extensive regulatory powers to the newly constituted EPA. Environmental improvement was now to be the
province of an expert federal agency. As such, the 1970 Act represented a quantum leap in federal responsibility for cleaning up
the air.
B. Steps Leading to Attainment.-The drafters of the 1970 Act
designed a system of air pollution control that was comprehensive
in scope and optimistic in objective. As its central purpose, the
Act established the national policy goal of uniform air quality
high enough to protect all citizens against adverse pollution-created health effects. 34 To achieve this result, the 1970 Act set forth
a three-part strategy containing the following components:
(1) environmental quality objectives; (2) national performance
standards; and (3) planning and enforcement mechanisms. 35
These three features comprised the major elements of a rational
planning model for reaching tpe Act's air quality goals. A common factor affecting each of these items was that the air quality
objectives had to be achieved within a congressionally mandated
time. 36 The addition of a temporal dimension to the Clean Air
Act's structure was undoubtedly intended to provide a discipline
to the regulatory process. However, it also gave rise to the possibility of regulatory failure in achieving the Act's goals. This is the
problem of non-attainment.
Environmental Q]tality Objectives-The National Ambient Air Qp.ality Standards .-The 1970 Act established the concept of the
NAAQS as the Act's main organizing principle and regulatory ob34. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1679-80 (amending Clean Air Act
u.s.c. § 7409 (1988)).
35. See id., 84 Stat. at 1678-84 (amending Clean Air Act §§ 108-111, 42
u.s.c. §§ 7408-7411 (1988)).
36. Id., 84 Stat. at 1679 (amending Clean Air Act § 109(a)(l), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(a)(1) (1988)).
§ 109, 42
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jective.37 Importantly, the statute made the function of NAAQS
determination an exclusively federal responsibility.38 This was a
major departure from the 1967 scheme of allowing the states to
set and enforce their own ambient air quality standards.39
Under the terms of sections 108 and 109 ofthe 1970 amendments,40 the EPA was to develop the NAAQS at two increasingly
stringent levels: primary standards to protect human health and
secondary ones which would preserve the public welfare. The
statute then laid out a multi-step NAAQS standard-setting procedure to be exercised by the EPA in its role as a health effects and
technology assessment expert.41 Within this context the EPA set
standards for six pollutants and thereby defined the meaning of
"healthy air" for the nation. Although there has been some adjustment of the standards over the twenty year period, the
NAAQS have remained relatively stable in number and definition.
Recently, however, there have been demands to tighten the air
quality standards further to protect public health.42
National Perfonnance Standards .-A second significant component of the 1970 Act's structure was the allocation to the EPA of
the responsibility for setting performance standards for new motor vehicles, new polluting facilities, and sources of hazardous air
emissions.43 Believing that each of these sources presented a serious threat to air quality, Congress granted the EPA the authority to mandate emission performance standards in the form of
technological solutions to reduce air emissions. Exhaust pollution from new motor vehicles was required to be reduced by at
least ninety percent in no more than six years.44 Once again Congress selected a policy which emphasized the centralized EPA's
development of state-of-the-art technical rules for significant air
pollution sources. This technologically optimistic policy assumed
the EPA to be sufficiently competent to make these complex engi37. Id., 84 Stat. at 1678-79 (amending Clean Air Act§§ 108-109, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7408-7409 (1988)).
38. Id.
39. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
40. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1678-79 (amending Clean Air Act
§§ 108-109, 42 u.s.c. §§ 7408-7409 (1988)).
41. Id., 84 Stat. at 1679-80 (amending Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409 (1988)).
42. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 222 Uune 17, 1988) (criticism of ambient so2
standards); see also 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2525 (Apr. 22, 1988).
43. See Clean Air Act subchapter II,§§ 111, 112,42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7554,
7411, 7412 (1988).
44. See id. § 202(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7421(b)(1) (1988).

22

1990 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

neering judgments and to be free from any anti-regulatory attitude that a state might foster in its desire to encourage local
industry.
Planning and Enforcement Mechanisms .-The final major component in the 1970 Clean Air Act scheme of air quality management
was the development of the State Implementation Plan ("SIP"). 45
The drafters of the Act viewed the SIP as the principal mechanism
for state involvement in the newly federalized system of air pollution control. 46 Each state was required to devise a plan containing certain statutorily enumerated provisions that would attain
the primary NAAQS "as expeditiously as practicable but ... in no
case later than three years from the date of[plan approval] .... " 47
Read literally, this would have meant that SIPs would have had to
project attainment ofthe primary NAAQS by 1975, or 1977 at the
latest, if certain extensions were granted. Maintenance of the primary NAAQS would thereafter have been required, and the secondary NAAQS would have had to have been achieved within a
"reasonable time."4B
The controlling idea in section 110 was that states, rather
than the EPA, would be free to design a SIP tailored to their individual pollution control preferences. 49 This local option system
permitted the states to make the most direct public policy choices
about which categories of sources would reduce their emission
and to what degree. 5° The language of the 1970 Act in general
45. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1680-83 (amending Clean Air Act
§ 110, 42 u.s.c. § 7410 (1988)).
46. The conference report accompanying the 1970 Clean Air Act contained
the following language:
The conference substitute makes it the primary responsibility of each State
to assure air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State
by submitting an implementation plan for such State for achieving air quality standards. All interstate and intrastate regions designated prior to enactment of this legislation would remain in effect. The Administrator
retains authority to designate interstate and intrastate regions and is authorized to approve the establishment by the State of intrastate regions.
H.R. Rep. No. 1783, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5376.
47. Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A)(i) (1988)
(amended 1990).
48. Id. § 110(a)(2)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A)(ii).
49. However, the statute's anti-preemptive policy contained in section 116
was limited. States could not vary the automobile standards, except for California, nor could they change the new sources performance standards set under
Clean Air Act§ Ill, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1988) (amended 1990).
50. See 116 Cong. Rec. 42,382 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie) ("The
Senate remains convinced that most effective enforcement of standards would

COOPERATIVE FAILURE

23

continued to speak in terms of local or state autonomy. Thus,
one of the Act's initial findings was that "the prevention and control of air pollution is the primary responsibility of states and local government."5 1
The EPA principally had an evaluative function in this statemanaged plan formulation process; it ascertained whether the SIP
air pollution control provisions projected attainment of the
NAAQS by the date specified in the Act. Other functions allotted
to the EPA in the 1970 Act include approving SIP revisions, extending compliance or attainment dates, and producing its own
SIP in case of state default. 52 The 1970 Act also accorded the
EPA significant enforcement powers both to order source compliance with SIP requirements and to seek judicial enforcement in
federal court.5 3 For example, under the Act, EPA approval of a
state's SIP rendered it federally enforceable and alterable only
·with the EPA's consent.54 Furthermore, a special provision existed to permit the EPA to assume SIP state enforcement responsibilities when there was widespread SIP violation and a failure of
state enforcement.55 While the rhetoric surrounding the enactment of the 1970 statute employed the language of shared power,
the federal actors appeared to have the upper hand. Congress set
the framework for air quality planning and installed the EPA as
the supervisor of the state's conduct, possessing significant powers of preemption should the state fail to enforce its SIP.56 To
assist the states, the 1970 Act authorized federal funding to help
support state air pollution programs.57 With the adoption of section llO, the structure of intergovernmental relationships afforded the federal government at least nominal superiority over
the states in the design and implementation of the SIPs. So long
as the EPA-approved SIPs actually provided for timely attainment
of the NAAQS, the odds of intergovernmental conflict remained
low. Nevertheless, the 1970 Act created the potential for an adtake place on the State and local levels. It was here that the public could participate most actively and bring the most effective pressure to bear for clean air.").
51. Clean Air Act § 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a}(3) (1988) (amended
1990).
52. See id. §§ 110(a)(3), 110(e)-(f), 110(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(3), 7410(e)(f), 7410(c).
53. See id. § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
54. Id. §§ 110(a}(3), 113, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a}(3), 7413.
55. Id. § 113(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2).
56. Id. § 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1).
57. The 1970 Act provided authorization for one billion dollars in slate
program funding over the period 1971-73. See 116 Cong. Rec. 42,386 (1970).
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versarial relationship between the federal and state governments
if air quality goals were not reached.
As the mid-1970s' attainment dates approached, it became
rapidly apparent that in many areas the NAAQS would not be
achieved on time. 5 8 The Clean Air Act's SIP strategy-unrealistic
in temporal terms-had failed to produce timely attainment. This
failure presented the EPA with a daunting responsibility: the design of a post-attainment date policy without express congressional direction. Many questions remained to be answered:
would all states with non-attainment areas be required to submit
plan revisions indicating attainment? What would the new attainment date be? The implications of non-attainment were thought
to be bleak. 59
The non-attainment issue also crystallized the conflict between the federal goals of clean air and local economic and social
interests in economic health. Recognition of this conflict highlighted the direct link between federal air pollution policy and local land use and economic development.
Yet there remained the question of whether the pursuit of
nationwide attainment would be justified and supported when the
true dimensions of the aggregated associated economic cost to
local interests were known. The EPA was unwilling to administer
a devastating blow of federally mandated factory shutdowns to
the American economy as a consequence of non-attainment. In
1976, it fashioned an interim policy to preserve its general air
quality goals without unduly stifling economic growth. And, to
accommodate both the federal and the local interests, it also developed an "offset" or "trade-off" policy that would permit limited new source growth in non-attainment areas. 60 The
centerpiece of this policy used new source construction to spur
the cleanup or shutdown of heavily-polluting existing facilities. 61
New facilities would be allowed to locate in such areas if their
emissions would be offset by a reduction in existing source emissions resulting in a "positive net air quality benefit." 62
58. See I W. Rodgers, Environmental Law-Air and Water 273 (1986).
59. Id. ("(T]he predicted consequence of non-attainment under the 1970
amendments was a flat ban on new sources for the obvious reason, to put it
starkly, that if prevailing air quality brought death and destruction, there was
little to commend a move that would aggravate conditions already quite bad
enough. The very real prospect, then, was a shutdown of industrial growth in
many parts of the nation.").
60. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524, 55,528 (1976).
61. Id. at 55,528.
62. See id. at 55,528-29 (1976).
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But this new EPA trade-off policy alone would not bring nonattainment areas into compliance with the NAAQS. In 1977,
Congress was forced to deal with this complex issue by adopting
the first legislative component designed expressly to deal with the
problem of non-attainment. 63 In a number of significant ways,
this new component shifted the relationship between state and
federal government in favor of stricter federal direction.
IV

THE 1977 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments ("1977 Act") responded to the problem of non-attainment by adding a new Subpart D ("Part D") to the Act64 and by relying in part upon the
fundamental planning and enforcement structure of the 1970
Act65 as well as the EPA's trade-offpolicy.66 Specifically, the 1977
amendments retained the pre-existing policy of nationally uniform attainment dates for all NAAQS pollutants.67 No consideration was given to the idea of regionally variable attainment dates
because the new law embraced a policy of complete regional and
temporal uniformity in all matters pertaining to attainment.
In the area of non-attainment, some innovations were incorporated into the 1977 law that limited state options for dealing
with non-attainment conditions.68 The 1977 Act thus began to
erode the traditional federal-state relationship. Nevertheless,
while the EPA's powers were enhanced and more limitations on
state discretion were imposed by the 1977 Act, the general pattern of state planning and federal supervision continued.
Designation of Non-Attainment Areas.-Following the 1977 Act,
the attainment status of a geographical area had significant implications for the potential economic growth of a region. The
63. Clean Air Act§§ 171-178, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (1988). See Connecticut Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 998, 1001 (2d Cir.), ccrt.
denied sub nom. Manchester Envd. Coalition v. EPA, 450 U.S. 1035 (1982)
("When it became apparent that many states would fail to meet the NAAQSs by
even mid-1977 because of inadequate state regulation and industry violations,
Congress rescued these states from a possible shutdown of existing sources of
pollution and a ban on new sources in excessively polluted areas by amending
the Act.").
64. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 746-51 (1977); see infra notes 78-80
and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
67. Clean Air Act§ 172(a}, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a) (1988) (amended 1990).
68. Id. § 172(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (amended 1990).
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amendments established a procedure for classifying all lands for
purposes of the Act. First, it required that the states submit lists
of data by early 1978 identifying the attainment status of all Air
Quality Control Regions ("AQCRs") within their borders. 69 Areas were to be classified as one of the following: attainment, nonattainment, or unclassifiable. 70 Next, Congress directed the EPA
to promulgate this list either intact or as modified by the EPA. 71
This step was to be accomplished within sixty days of the state's
submittal of its list. The information upon which the attainment
status designations were based was either direct monitoring data
or diffusion computer model projections. 72 Finally, non-attainment status could change over time, requiring redesignation from
one category to another. Redesignation requests generally come
from the states; indeed, at least one federal court of appeals concluded that the EPA could not modify existing designations unless a state had previously asked for the change. 73
Extension ofAttainment Deadlines and Non-Attainment Area SIPs.One way to avoid the problem of non-attainment was to redefine
the concept of attainment by postponing the date by which the
NAAQS had to be achieved. In 1977, Congress revised the attainment principle when it adopted a two-tiered system of attainment date extensions at five and ten year intervals. 74 The first
deadline was applicable to all NAAQS pollutants, while the second was available for those areas experiencing severe pollution
created by automobiles. In selecting these deadlines, congressional drafters optimistically believed that the times specified
were reasonable and attainable throughout the nation. Moreover, the drafters failed to make any provision for states or regions to obtain attainment date extensions beyond those set out
in the 1977 Act. 75
69. See id. § 107(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(amended 1990).
70. See id.
71. Id. § 107(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(2) (amended 1990).
72. Id. § 171(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (1988). The statute clearly anticipated this information and courts were extremely willing to accept it. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Castle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980); Cincinnati Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Castle, 632 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1980); PPG Indus. Inc. v. Costle, 630
F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1980); and Columbus & Southern Ohio Elec. Co. v. Castle,
638 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1980).
73. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1983); sec
also 53 Fed. Reg. 29,724 (1988) (EPA's acquiescence to court ruling).
74. See Clean Air Act§ 172(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a) (1988).
75. Id. Much of the structure ofPart D originated in the Senate's version of
the bill. See 123 Cong. Rec. 27070 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1570, 1573.
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Nevertheless, the confident statements of the sponsors of the
1970 Act about meeting the NAAQS in a timely fashion gave way
to serious talk about the difficulty of reaching attainment status
and the need for a carefully designed and well-implemented system of regulation.76 As a matter of policy, these time extensions
were not automatically effective; rather, they were conditioned
upon the states undertaking and the EPA approving a number of
SIP revisions to ensure that attainment would be reached by the
dates set in the Act. These SIP revisions were mandatory obligations and necessary to avoid statutory sanctions.77
Of greatest importance to this scheme was the requirement
in section 172 that the states revise their SIPs to provide for attainment "as expeditiously as practicable... [but] not later than
December 31, 1982."78 Enhanced SIP commitments were necessary for further delay of the attainment date for carbon monoxide
and hydrocarbons until 1987. Congress continued to rely upon
the regulatory structure of air quality plans with concrete performance objectives to be achieved by fixed future dates.
Congress also set forth eleven explicit programmatic characteristics for these revised SIPs.79 The program elements of an
acceptable SIP did not require the gradual adjustment of the preexisting SIPs but rather mandated the adoption of significant new
provisions to control state discretion in regulating air pollution
sources in non-attainment areas. For instance, existing air pollution sources were forced to assist the attainment effort by complying with a new technology requirement termed "reasonably
available control technology." 80 Moreover, new sources were obligated to undergo a permitting process that included pre-construction review and meeting a stringent series of approval
conditions.5 1
As might be expected, even greater program demands were
imposed for those states which requested the second stage exten76. 123 Cong. Rec. 27070 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1570, 1573.
77. See Clean Air Act § 172(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (1988) (amended
1990).
78. Id. § 172(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1) (amended 1990).
79. See id. § 172(b}, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (1988). This section contained a
broad scope of the factors to be considered and emphasized existing source control, emission inventory data, new source permitting procedures, and organization principles.
80. Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 5l.l(o) (1990) (regulatory definition ofRACT).
81. See Clean Air Act§ 173(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)-(4) (1988) (amended 1990).
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sion to 1987. In its specificity of SIP requirements, the 1977 Act
at least began the process of federal control of state planning activity in non-attainment areas and curbed state discretion in designing a customized non-attainment plan.
Upgraded Sanctions for SIP Failure .-Section 172 continued the
previous practice of congressional specification of state air pollution program features followed by a process of EPA approval or
disapproval within statutory deadlines. In this case, the states
were required to have their revised SIPs approved by the EPA in
less than two years from enactment of the 1977 amendments. 82
In addition, the 1977 Act maintained the EPA's existing power to
prepare a SIP for any state failing to submit one deemed to be
adequate.s3
If this were the extent of the authority allotted the EPA to
carry out the planning requirements of the non-attainment program, the 1977 Act would not constitute a major departure from
the 1970 Act. However, the drafters of the 1977 Act believed that
the EPA needed greater leverage to ensure that states developed
and implemented SIPs adequate to reach attainment status by
1987. The potential impact of these new sanctions apparently
was deemed sufficient to bring reluctant states into line. In reality, however, the sanctions changed the EPA's relationship with
the states, at least symbolically, to one in which the EPA was
transformed into the superior force endowed with punitive
powers.
The 1977 amendments provided the EPA with a number of
new enforcement mechanisms to assist it in obtaining state cooperation in the non-attainment program. The most prominent of
these devices was the EPA's new authority, under section
110(a)(2)(1), to prohibit construction or modification of major
stationary sources in any non-attainment area that was not under
a legitimate SIP. 84 This new section indicated Congress' view
that the EPA's pre-existing power to promulgate directly an SIP
for a recalcitrant state was inadequate. 85 Undoubtedly, the predominant policy imperative in the new section was the need to
compel satisfactory state participation in the SIP development
and implementation process. This construction ban authority appeared to give the EPA tremendous leverage over uncooperative
states by threatening the ability of such states to locate major in82.
83.
84.
85.

See id. § 172, 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (1988).
Id. § 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (amended 1990).
Id. § 11 O(a)(2)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(1) (amended 1990).
Id. § llO(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (amended 1990).
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dustrial facilities in non-attainment areas.86 Congress apparently
believed that, with regard to non-attainment, such an intrusion
into local matters of land use and economic development was
warranted.
The Clean Air Act amendments also provided for three other
sanctions which, if used, would deny federal funding for a variety
of state and local government activities.5 7 Thus, for the first time,
Congress attempted to employ financial leverage in its air pollution law to obtain the cooperation, not of the regulated emission
sources, but of the state governments themselves. The theory behind these provisions was that fiscal pressure might accomplish
what the construction ban and the threat of direct EPA SIP promulgation could not.
Section 176 mandated that neither the EPA nor the Department of Transportation would grant federal funds to states for
use in a non-attainment area where transportation controls were
needed to achieve attainment and the state had failed to submit a
plan considering such controls.8 B More generally, the Act also
stated that no Clean Air Act grants would be made when an approved SIP was not being implemented.B9 Finally, the EPA was
accorded discretionary authority to limit funds for the construction of sewage treatment works in any area where a state failed to
effectuate a plan to control emissions associated with the sewage
treatment facility. 90 This third sanction gave the EPA potentially
substantial power over local land development.
Conclusions Regarding the 1977 Amendments and the Evolution of
Non-Attainment Policy.-The 1977 Clean Air Act amendments represent the first direct legislative recognition of the non-attainment
problem. The subpart D program reflected the recognition that
the 1970 system of SIP development, approval, and enforcement
had failed to reach its primary objective: the NAAQS remained
important yet unrealized public health goals even after seven
years. The national goal of achieving uniformly healthy air had
proved to be more elusive than the drafters of the 1970 Act
86. The General Accounting Office ("GAO") analyzed the impact of the
construction ban and indicated that it was largely ineffective as of 1985. See
GAO, EPA's Sanctions Policy Is Not Consistent with the Clean Air Act, GAO/
RCED-85-121 (1985) [hereinafter GAO Repon].
87. See Clean Air Act§ 176(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a) (1988); id. § 176{b), 42
u.s.c. § 7506(b); id. § 316(b), 42 u.s.c. § 7616(b).
88. Id. § 176(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a).
89. ld. § 176(b), 42 u.s.c. § 7506(b).
90. ld. § 316(b), 42 u.s.c. § 7616(b).
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imagined. Reaching that goal would require time, programmatic
sophistication, and a willingness to sacrifice short-term economic
interests for long term health benefits.
It was apparent that the true price for the uniform attainment
of the NAAQS under the 1977 legislation would have to be paid
at the state and local level. By focusing on stationary source and
transportation control measures and setting forth enhanced planning and permitting regulatory requirements applicable only to
sources in non-attainment areas, the Act established an undesirable classification surely unwanted by state and local governments.91 For classification of part of a state's territory as nonattainment would limit its industrial growth and demand greater
air quality planning effort.
While operating within the general structure of the 1970 air
quality planning program, the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments
altered the principles of cooperative federalism stated by the
prior Act: any idea that the air pollution law would harness the
collaborative energies of equals was surely abandoned. The elements set out in subpart D specified state participation in terms of
precise programmatic and permitting requirements. State government was to be viewed not as an equal partner in the pollution
control effort but rather as an unwilling instrument of the federal
air pollution policy.
Within this revised statutory scheme, Congress gave little
thought to the continuing relationship of the EPA and the states.
While the ultimate objective of reaching attainment was clearly
set out, 92 little statutory attention was given to the direction of
the EPA in its management of the subpart D program. The absence of guidance to the Agency combined with the lack of truly
effective state inducements and sanctions created the potential for
a program which would fail to achieve its purpose. Like its predecessor,93 the 1977 Act also failed to consider the possibility that
attainment would not be achieved by the extended attainment
dates. Possibly, this failure reflected its confidence in the new
regulatory program and optimism about the program's eventual
91. The most direct reflection of this was the high number of cases filed to
challenge the non-attainment designation process. See, e.g., Western Oil & Gas
Ass'n v. EPA, 767 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1985); Dressman v. Costle, 759 F.2d 548
(6th Cir. 1985); U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979).
92. See Clean Air Act§ 172(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7502(a)(1) (1988) (amended
1990).
93. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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success. The experience since 1977 shows that this confidence
was misplaced.

v
POST-1977 EXPERIENCE OF THE NONATTAINMENT PROGRAM
Enactment of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendment's non-attainment provisions did not result in the achievement of the
NAAQS.94 More than thirteen years after the passage of that legislation, the attainment goal remains elusive. The post-1977 experience with the non-attainment program reveals a pattern of
delayed and reluctant cooperation between the EPA and the
states in the preparation of the revised SIPs and the implementation of control measures intended to lead the nation towards the
objective of clean air. This time period also has witnessed a
change in the EPA's role: instead of encouraging and certifying
the state preparation of adequate SIPs, it now disapproves of
state SIP development and threatens substantial sanctions on uncooperative states. The EPA's policy in this area could also be
inconsistent, and one that labors against the pressure of
unachievable, uniform statutory deadlines. Beyond this, the EPA
spent most of the 1980s attempting to design a post-attainment
date non-attainment policy in the absence of direct congressional
guidance.
Attempts to Follow the Act.-In formulating the 1977 amendments, Congress sought to ensure achievement of the new
NAAQS attainment dates by imposing a precise schedule for air
quality planning and implementation.95 A range of sanctions also
were made available to bolster the EPA's authority to obtain necessary SIP revisions and the adoption of control measures.96
First, the non-attainment areas were to be identified and formally
listed by early 1978.97 The EPA met this requirement by promul94. See Grider, Interstate Air Pollution: Over a Decade oflneffective Regulation, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 619 (1988) ("Unfortunately, [the 1977 amendments
to the Clean Air Act] have not proven effective. Case law and statutory analysis
demonstrate that there are no current regulations ••• at the federal or state level
which provide an adequate remedy for states plagued by interstate air
pollution.").
95. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685
(1977).
96. See id., 91 Stat. at 704; supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
97. See id. § 103, 91 Stat. at 687-88 (adding Clean Air Act§ 107(d)(1), 42
u.s.c. § 7407(d)(1) (1988)).
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gating attainment status designations under section 107(d). 98 In
March 1978, the EPA designated over four hundred areas as nonattainment for one or more primary or secondary NAAQS. 99
Once the geographical extent of non-attainment status was
known, the second step of the program required the state submission of SIP revisions for non-attainment areas no later than
January 1, 1979. 100 These revisions were intended to contain reasonably available control measures ("RACM") and were expected
to demonstrate annual incremental progress towards the
December 31, 1982 attainment date.I0 1 An examination of the
statutory design reveals an SIP revision process and implementation of control strategies which were to occur within a compressed period of time. This temporal element, along with the
fundamental difficulty of the task, would cause the EPA to
reformulate its approach numerous times without substantial
success.
The EPA initially took a forceful position with regard to the
demands of Part D. In July 1979, it issued a rule stating that the
construction ban authorized by section 11 O(a)(2)(1) would apply
immediately to any designated non-attainment area that did not
have an approved SIP. 102 Because the EPA had not approved any
Part D SIPs for carbon monoxide and ozone at the time, the ban
became effective in every non-attainment area. This sanction
would be removed gradually over the next three years, however,
as most states submitted their SIPs (originally required in January
1979) and the EPA approved or "conditionally" approved
them. 103 By the end of 1982, therefore, most ozone and carbon
monoxide non-attainment areas were not under the construction
ban for failing to have an approved SIP.to4
By its terms, the 1977 Act required not only approved and
timely air quality planning, but also actual attainment of the
NAAQS by December 31, 1982. 105 As 1982 drew to a close, the
98. See id., 48 Fed. Reg. 4,972 (1982).
99. See 43 Fed. Reg. 8,962 (1978). The EPA adjusted many of these designations in the fall of 1978. See id. at 40,502.
100. Clean Air Act§ 172(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7502(a)(1) (1988).
101. Id.
102. 44 Fed. Reg. 38,471 (1979).
103. See 48 Fed. Reg. 5,022 (1983). For a specific example of conditional
approval of SIPs, see id. at 5,282 (conditional approval of Indiana SIP); see also
1990 Act, supra note 3, § 101, 104 Stat. at 2407 (providing for conditional approval of SIP revisions).
104. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 5,025-29.
105. Clean Air Act§ 172(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7502(a)(1) (1988).
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EPA embarked upon a strategy of employing existing air quality
data to list the 4 74 non-attainment counties as either a Tier I or a
Tier II county. 106 Tier I consisted of approximately 330 counties
that had their SIP revisions fully approved, would likely meet all
attainment deadlines, and could have their area redesignated as
attainment during 1983. 107 Tier I would not be subject to future
sanctions. Tier II was comprised of 111 counties that would not
likely meet their deadline for one or more pollutants and thirtythree other counties that still had not met all of their 1979 SIP
revision requirements. 1os
Adapting the Part D Program to the Reality of Continuing Non-Attainment.-The EPA targeted the Tier II group for the sanctions
provided by the Act. After the passage of the 1982 attainment
date, it took an aggressive position regarding both the non-attainment deadlines and the use of available sanctions as leverage
against the states. Specifically, the EPA proposed to disapprove
the SIPs of Tier II areas and impose the Act's construction
ban. 109 This position was decisive and best effectuated the literal
meaning of the Clean Air Act. It rightly accorded little room for
avoiding the statutory commands of the 1977 Act. The position
also reflected a belief that the construction ban was an influential
and potentially motivating force which would prompt the states to
reach attainment. 110 By taking this punitive approach, moreover,
the EPA's role became decidedly more adversarial toward the
states. Ultimately, this position became impossible to sustain.
The EPA's policy of strict enforcement brought on a
firestorm of criticism from Congress, the states, and the public in
general. 111 Much of the criticism emphasized that the widespread
imposition of the construction ban would penalize those states
which had made good faith efforts to control emissions but
failed. 112 More importantly, it was feared that widespread use of
the construction ban would cause serious harm to local economies.113 Congress was sufficiently attuned to this opposition to
the EPA's interpretation of its statutory mandate. It enacted leg106. See 48 Fed. Reg. 4,972-73 (1983).
107. See id. at 4,975 and Appendix C.
108. See id. at 4,973 and Appendi.x D.
109. Id. at 4,972.
110. The 1985 GAO report cast doubt both on the legality of the EPA's
post-1982 policy and the efficacy of the construction ban as a motivator. See
GAO Report, supra note 86, at 15-16.
IlL See id. at 3.
112. See id. at 6.
113. See id.
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islation barring the Agency from using any appropriated funds
during the 1984 fiscal year to impose the construction ban in nonattainment areas with previously approved SIPs. 1 14
In response to both the funding law and the vocal opposition, the EPA reversed its construction ban policy and allowed
non-attainment states one more year to revise their SIPs in order
to provide for attainment "as expeditiously as practicable."ll&
Furthermore, this revised policy emphasized a new spirit of cooperative planning rather than the imposition of sanctions. 116 Nevertheless, as a check against recalcitrance, the new EPA policy
mandated that the construction ban and the funding sanctions
could be imposed in the event that a state failed to respond to this
SIP call in an adequate fashion.ll 7
As the 1980s progressed, it became increasingly apparent
that NAAQS violations for ozone and carbon monoxide would
continue well beyond the Clean Air Act's ultimate 1987 deadline.
Laboring under a statute which accorded it very little flexibility,
the EPA realized that attainment could be reached in the short
term-the early 1990's-only through the use of "draconian"
measures that would be "severely disruptive." 118 Using administrative ingenuity, the Agency developed two proposals in 1986 to
"reasonably" tighten state SIPs through greater EPA involvement
so that attainment would be reached at some indeterminate future point. 119 By mid-1987, however, the EPA concluded that it
114. See Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent
Agencies Appropriation Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-45, 97 Stat. 219, 226 (1983).
115. States also would have an opportunity to cure other deficiencies in the
SIPs. See 48 Fed. Reg. 50,686 (1983). The EPA employed contorted reasoning
to reach the conclusion that Part D did not require the SIPs to provide for actual
attainment. See id. at 50,690-91.
116. In February, 1984, the EPA made calls for 27 SIP revisions in 15
states: 18 revisions for ozone, 6 for carbon monoxide, 2 for sulfur dioxide, and
I for nitrogen dioxide. Of these 27 revisions, 21 were for areas with approved
SIPs which had failed attainment by 1982 and 6 were for areas which had not
even submitted an SIP. Later, in December 1984, the EPA made 10 more calls
for SIP revisions in 9 more states. See GAO Report, supra note 86, at 15.
117. 48 Fed. Reg. 50,693 (1983). During mid-1982, the EPA began receiving supplemental SIP revisions for 1987 extension areas. The EPA acknowledged that the SIPs for some large urban areas would not be able to
demonstrate attainment by 1987 under any configuration. Id. However, the
EPA stated that it would consider approving such an SIP if the state showed that
it would produce attainment shortly thereafter. See 46 Fed. Reg. 7,182 (1981).
118. 52 Fed. Reg. 26,404 (1987).
I
119. See id. (discussing "Sustained Progress Program" and the "Reason·
able Extra Efforts Program").
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did not have sufficient authority to embark on such a course without a clearly stated statutory mandate. 120
During the next two years, the EPA developed its present
non-attainment policy, which resulted in the disapproval of the
pending SIPs and in the issuance of new calls for SIP revisions.
By November, 1989, the EPA issued SIP calls for ozone revisions
in 184 counties containing over 135 million people, and carbon
monoxide revisions in 121 counties with nearly ninety million
people. 121
The Agency's approach in the late 1980s was influenced by
the extended process of statutory amendment that had been undenvay for most of the decade. 122 The uncertainty caused by the
continuing possibility of a comprehensive legislative alteration to
the non-attainment provisions certainly affected the way in which
both the states and the EPA viewed their respective tasks. States
had little incentive to embark upon major new air quality planning initiatives when the statutory demands were sure to change.
Congressional delay in amending the Clear Air Act contributed both to this problem and to the current problem of nationwide non-attainment by denying the EPA necessary policy
guidance and clear authority to act. To avoid this type of administrative uncertainty and to ensure that the EPA can deal effectively with the states, Congress must concentrate on making the
Act's non-attainment provisions not only effective as a matter of
environmental objective, but also more durable and adaptable
over time. The post-1977 experience has made the optimism expressed by the drafters of the Clean Air Act of 1970 at least premature. The enormous resources expended by government and
industry to comply with the mandates of the Act failed to achieve
the Act's fundamental attainment goal: uniformly healthy air
throughout the nation. At present, over 150 million Americans
live in areas with air that violates the federal primary air quality
120. See id. (1987 public notice stating that the EPA should not "make
choices between health and economic values that arc essentially legislath·c in
character and magnitude. It is not properly the EPA's role as an administrative
agency to take on the task of making such choices without a considcrnbl}'
stronger indication of Congressional delegation than now exists.").
121. See EPA, Status in 1988 & 1989 Calls for State Implementation Plan
Revisions-Ozone and Carbon Monoxide (1989).
122. The Senate Report on S. 1630-the precursor to the 1990 Clean Air
Act amendments-described the extended, unsuccessful attempts to enact comprehensive clean air legislation in 1982, 1984, and 1987. SeeS. Rep. No. 228,
lOlst Gong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989).
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standards for health.12s
Thus, after twenty years, the main objectives of the Clean Air
Act have not yet been realized. In the 1990s, attainment of the
health-related air quality standards remains an elusive yet socially
desirable goal. But the development of the policy to achieve this
goal must occur over time, for environmental policy in the United
States is not static; its progression is influenced by numerous
forces, both within and outside government. As in other environmental areas, the dominant pattern of federal air pollution law is
the incremental development of legislative policy as objectives
change and experience is acquired. With the 1990 amendments,
Congress has greatly refined non-attainment policy and given serious attention to federal-state relations.
VI
THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE NONATTAINMENT PRINCIPLE: THE 1990
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS

Clean Air Act Development .-The third major revision of federal
air pollution policy after the 1970 and 1977 Acts occurred in
November 1990 and likely will set the direction of air pollution
public policy for the next decade. The 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act (" 1990 Act") 124 are truly comprehensive modifications to air pollution control law in this nation. A document formidable in length and complexity, the legislation addresses entire
new areas of concern such as air toxics, 125 acid deposition control, 126 and stratospheric ozone 127 and global climate protection.128 The amendments also have affected subjects already
treated by pre-existing law by adding considerably to the detail
and specificity of the statutory language. 129 The non-attainment
issue is one of these topics. 130 In supplementing the coverage of
the Part D provisions of the 1977 Act, Congress has substantially
123. See id. at II.
124. 1990 Act, supra note 3.
125. See, e.g., id. §§ 301-306, 104 Stat. at 2531-84 (mobile source-related
air toxics).
126. See id. §§ 401-413, 104 Stat. at 2584-634.
127. See id. §§ 601-603, 104 Stat. at 2648-72.
128. See, e.g., id. § 821, 104 Stat. at 2699.
129. See, e.g., id. § 102, 104 Stat. at 2399-471 (provisions for attainment
and maintenance of NAAQS).
130. Id. §§ 101, 171-172, 104 Stat. at 2399, 2412-15.
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redefined its non-attainment policy and attempted to cure defects
identified during the last thirteen years.
Retention of the Attainment Objective with Variable Achievement
Deadlines .-Although numerous changes have been made to the
format and coverage of the non-attainment provisions, the basic
structure of the pre-existing policy ofboth the 1970 Act and 1977
Act is left intact. Thus, the new law retains the essential organizing concept of attainment of the NAAQS as a nationally uniform
definition of clean air.I3I
However, this legislation has made even familiar concepts
considerably more complex. For instance, in contrast to the 1977
law, under which every state was required to have air quality conforming to the requirements of the NAAQS by a single, fixed
deadline, the 1990 Act states that the uniform air pollution standard need not be achieved at the same time in all parts of the
nation. 132 Attainment dates vary in two ways. First, different
lengths of time to reach attainment are provided for different
NAAQS pollutants. Second, different lengths of time are allocated to reach attainment for each pollutant depending upon the
severity of the pollution in each non-attainment area. 13 3 This variation in attainment dates reflects a congressional recognition
that the time allowed for air pollution cleanup should be tailored
to the pollutant and to the severity of the pollution. Consequently, attainment dates for the same pollutant would vary in
length according to the level of NAAQS violation. Therefore, it
would be possible for a state to have up to five different attainment dates for ozone in different parts of its territory.
Congress also decided to exercise greater control over both
the general process of establishing non-attainment status and the
specific identification of the degrees of non-attainment. Unlike
the 1977 Act, the new statute defines certain areas as non-attainment as a matter oflaw, thereby restricting the ability of both the
EPA and the states to influence such important regulatory definitions.134 Furthermore, the EPA's authority to redesignate an area
from non-attainment to attainment is circumscribed by a specific
six-part test intended to reflect the Agency's determination of
131. Id. § 181(a)(1), 104 Stat. at 2423.
132. See id.
133. The 1990 Act establishes five categories of ozone non-attainmentmarginal, moderate, serious, severe, and extreme--and defines them in technical terms. See id.
134. See id. § 101(a), 104 Stat. at 2399 (amending Clean Air Act§ 107(d),
42 u.s.c. § 7407(d) (1988)).

38

1990 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

complete compliance with the Act. 1ll 5 This pattern of highly detailed congressional directive is repeated throughout the 1990
Act, and it substantially limits the discretion of both the EPA and
the states. 1ll 6
Federal Financial Support of State Air Pollution Control Programs.One consistent feature of federal air pollution law has been the
recognition of the federal government's role in providing funding
for state air pollution programs. The new statute extends this
practice by authorizing general funding for state programs and
specific funding for non-attainment programming. 137
In addition to the extension of this traditional form of intergovernmental program support, the Act also requires that states
tap new revenue sources to support their air quality programs. It
directs states to charge pollution sources permit fees in an
amount sufficient to cover the reasonable costs of developing and
administering the Clean Air Act permit system. 138 These fees, a
mandatory component of each state's SIP, are correlated to the
amount of source emissions to encourage reduction of such emis135. Clean Air Act §§ 107(d)(3)(A)-(F), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d)(3)(A)-(F) (as
amended by 1990 Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § lOl(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2401-02
(1990)).
136. See supra notes 56-57, 87-90 and accompanying text.
137. See 1990 Act, supra note 3, § 822, 104 Stat. at 2699 (amending Clean
Air Act. § 327, 42 U.S.C. § 7626 (1988)). With the expansion of planning and
regulatory responsibilities under the 1990 amendments, the availability of increased governmental financial resources became a significant issue, especially
in light of what had occurred in the 1980s. While air program demands grew,
the funding available fell in nominal and real terms. This drop was considered
one of the primary reasons for the failure of the non-attainment program to
reach its goals during the 1980s. SeeS. Rep. No. 228, 10lst Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989). The Senate committee report addressed this issue of inadequate government funding and concluded that:
Lack of resources at the Federal, State and local level has severely hampered implementation of the Act's requirements. During the decade of the
1980's, while the demands on EPA grew, appropriated funds for the air pollution program, as for other EPA programs, decreased both in nominal and
real terms. States, which are required by the Act to impose permit fees to
cover the costs of administering and enforcing permit programs, in many
instances have not complied. Lack of resources led to preparation of inadequate and incomplete inventories, use of less costly-and less accuratemodels, less frequent review and updating of inventories and other data on
which control strategies are based, inadequate enforcement programs, and,
at the Federal level, woefully inadequate oversight of, and technical assistance to, the States.
S. Rep. No. 228, 10lst Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1989).
138. See 1990 Act, supra note 3, § 101, 104 Stat. at 2405 (amending Clean
Air Act§ 110(a)(2)(L), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(L) (1988)).
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sions. Thus, as emission reductions occur, the fees decline. In
general, the fees are intended to provide states with funds with
which to operate their air pollution programs. 139 The new financing method shifts the cost of such programs from the state to the
polluters themselves and also makes state agencies somewhat less
dependent upon state appropriation and federal program support. Potentially, these funds could help the states undertake
their non-attainment planning and enforcement actions in a more
professional and scientifically defensible way.
Federal Technical Assistance .-As the primary federal environmental agency, the EPA has the responsibility and specialized
competence for the production of technical information that
would be useful to the states in their air quality planning and regulation. This function of expert consultant to the states is extremely important because it can increase the technical
sophistication and effectiveness of SIPs. The 1990 amendments
charge the EPA ·with the duty of preparing a number of significant
guidance documents. There are at least three examples of this
requirement.
First, within six months of enactment of the amendments, the
EPA must issue two sets of guidelines for effective SIP development and evaluation. The first set of guidelines is for enhanced
air quality monitoring techniques, and the second, for improved
air emission source inventories. 140 General adoption of the techniques listed in these documents could improve the accuracy of
SIPs and create a greater uniformity of air quality regulatory practices from state to state.
Second, within one year of enactment, the EPA must publish
information regarding the formulation and emission-reduction
potential of at least sixteen transportation control measures.l 41
Such information could assist a state in designing a series of control measures to combat automobile-created air pollution. Moreover, the information is not merely advisory, for it must be used
in ozone non-attainment areas to offset growth in vehicle miles
traveled.
Third, the EPA is required to produce new control technique
guidelines ("CTGs") for eleven categories of ozone stationary
139. Id. Many states have not complied with the requirement that they
charge fees. SeeS. Rep. No. 228, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1989).
140. Clean Air Act§ l08(g) (as amended).
141. 1990 Act, supra note 3, § 108(b), 104 Stat. at 2465-66 (amending
Clean Air Act § 108(£)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7408(£)(1) (1988)).
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sources by 1993 and review periodically all existing CTGs. 142
The identification of available control technology is a function
well-suited to the EPA. Furthermore, these centrally issued and
nationally uniform CTGs can assist states in developing specific
emission limitations for many previously undercontrolled or uncontrolled sources.
Under the Act, the EPA also must issue CTGs or regulations
for certain specialized industrial sites and functions, including the
loading and unloading of petroleum carrying vessels, aerospace
coating and solvent applications, consumer and commercial products, and hazardous waste facilities. 143 With the increased need
for obtaining additional units of emission reductions, these special provisions will take on added significance. For, while they
grant states technical information, the provisions also deprive
states of the ability to control these source categories in a less
stringent manner.
Emphasis on State Implementation Plans .-Another major element of the pre-existing Clean Air Act strategy retained by the
1990 amendments is use of the SIP as the central air quality planning and regulatory device to achieve NAAQS attainment objectives. In their revised 1990 form, SIPs continue to serve as the
focus of the Clean Air Act program. The 1990 Act also maintains
primary state responsibility for the development and implementation of these plans. Furthermore, the EPA retains its role of
evaluator and plan designer in case of state failure. 144
The 1990 Act soon departs from these general similarities to
prior practice. The Act attempts to address a number of serious
deficiencies that Congress believes contributed to the current
widespread state of non-attainment.
SIP Development Rules .-The new statute sets forth several
general changes intended to improve the SIP development and
evaluation process. First, the Agency's power to partially approve
or disapprove a SIP submission has been confirmed. 145 Second,
the Act establishes new timetables and procedures for the evalua142. Id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2443 (adding Clean Air Act § 183(a)-(b)).
143. Id., 104 Stat. at 2443-44 (adding Clean Air Act § 183(b)-(c)).
144. See Clean Air Act § llO(c)(l) (as amended) (concerning the preparation of a Federal Implementation Plan ("FIP")). However, the Senate Report on
S. 1630 stated that the EPA intervention and takeover of the SIP would be considered a "last resort." SeeS. Rep. No. 228, lOlst Gong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989).
145. 1990 Act, supra note 3, § lOl(c), 104 Stat. at 2406-07 (adding Clean
Air Act § 11 0(k)(3), (4), 42 U.S.C. § 741 O(k)(3), (4)). This portion would overrule Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1987).
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tion of initial and revised SIPs, and directs the EPA to issue minimum criteria to apply when revie·wing the newly-submitted
SIPs. 146 Moreover, the EPA's time allotted for reviewing submitted plans was extended to twelve instead of four months, in order
to allow the needed review and rulemaking proceeding. 14 7 The
minimum completeness rules, coupled with the longer time allotted for closer scrutiny of SIPs should prove helpful to the states
and should expedite the EPA's SIP review process by eliminating
consideration of truly inadequate state plans.
Of major importance is the 1990 Act's enumeration of specific SIP development practices and control techniques required
to combat each kind of NAAQS violation. 14S Since accurate
emissions data is regarded as critical to the air quality regulatory
process, the 1990 Act mandates that the states use EPA monitoring and inventory guidance to prepare revised emission
inventories. 149
Substantive Non-Attainment SIP Requirements.-The 1990 Act
significandy modifies the previous non-attainment planning requirements by specifying program elements for each pollutant.Hio
In addition, non-attainment areas for each pollutant are classified
in terms of the severity of the NAAQS violation, and the new Act
defines required programmatic components for each such classification. For example, SIPs in "moderate" carbon monoxide nonattainment areas need only have "enhanced" vehicle inspection
and maintenance programs, 151 while SIPs for "serious" areas require listed transportation control measures, oxygenated fuels
programs, and employer ridership programs. 152 Moreover, the
statute sets out the mandatory steps to be taken to satisfy each
component ·with such precision that there should be litde uncertainty concerning statutory expectations. 153 Furthermore, because many of these specified SIP elements require control
146. 1990 Act, supra note 3, at§ 101(c), 104 Stat. at 2406-07 (adding Clean
Air Act § llO(k), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)).
147. Id. § 101(c), 104 Stat. at 2406 (adding Clean Air Act § 110(k)(2), 42
u.s.c. § 7410(k)(2)).
148. See id. §§ 103-106, 104 Stat. at 2423-64 (adding Clean Air Act
§§ 181-190).
149. See id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2430 (adding Clean Air Act§ 182(c)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(1)).
150. Id. §§ 103-106, 104 Stat. at 2423-64 (adding Clean Air Act §§ 181190).
151. Id. § 104, 104 Stat. at 2455 (adding Clean Air Act § 187(a)(6)).
152. Id. § 104, 104 Stat. at 2456 (adding Clean Air Act § 187(b)(2)-(3)).
153. See, e.g., id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2440-42 (adding Clean Air Act
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measures that are potentially unpalatable to state or local governments, the fact that they are imposed by direct congressional
mandate could relieve the EPA of the duty of justifying such an
unattractive SIP choice.
The new law also creates detailed and objective SIP performance goals beyond the general admonition that they demonstrate
attainment with the NAAQS by the relevant attainment date. For
example, in ozone non-attainment areas classified as "serious,"
an approvable SIP must demonstrate "reasonable further progress," defined as an annual three percent reduction in the emission of volatile organic compounds ("VOC") over a specific three
year period. 154 These goals do not specify the exact steps that a
state must take; rather, they establish fixed, statutory standards
against which the SIPs control techniques can be measured. In
addition, the SIPs prepared for carbon monoxide and mandated
that non-attainment areas contain quantitative "milestones," set
at every three years, demonstrating "reasonable further progress" toward timely achievement of the NAAQS.l 55 These milestones were intended to serve as concrete and objective measures
of the state's progress in reaching attainment. 15 6 With such clear
SIP performance standards, it would be difficult for either the
EPA or the states to claim that "reasonable" progress towards attainment had been made when it had not.
Continuing EPA/State SIP Management.-In response to an important criticism of prior practice, the 1990 Act directs continuous state/federal program interaction throughout the life of the
SIP. 157 Congress intended to compel EPA supervision over state
SIP development and implementation on a continuing basis in order to determine, in a rapid fashion, whether the state was moving toward expeditious attainment. The milestones and other
express performance standards serve as helpful indicators of state
progress. However, Congress appears to have been wary of the
passage of time in the administrative context; it thus forced the
EPA to take a considerably more active role in the management of
§ 182(g)) (defining programmatic components in terms of specific performance
criteria).
154. Id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2432 (adding Clean Air Act § l82(c)(2)(B)).
155. Id. § 102(a)(2)(B), 104 Stat. at 2412 (amending Clean Air Act
§ 171(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(1) (1988)). "Reasonable further progress" is defined by the 1990 Act's language as "annual incremental reductions ... as are
required ... for the purpose of ensuring" timely attainment. Id.
156. Id. § 104, 104 Stat. at 2457 (adding Clean Air Act § 187(d) (CO
milestone)).
157. See id §§ 101, 102, 104 Stat. at 2399-423.
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the Clean Air Act program. Consequently, several techniques
were inserted in the Act to ensure closer EPA oversight of state
conduct and air pollution control programs. In this ·way the 1990
Act provides specific management directives governing EPA-state
relations.
As part of this strategy of increased federal oversight, the
amendments impose regular reporting requirements on the states
to submit data for the EPA's review. For example, SIPs for ozone
areas must provide for annual reports discussing the air pollution
control measures adopted or implemented during the year and an
explanation of why the state failed to meet other SIP obligations.158 Periodic state emission inventories are also
mandatory. 159 Furthermore, at three year intervals, states must
test the automotive travel assumptions upon which their SIPs are
based and revise them if the earlier predictions underestimated
actual car use in the area. 160 This step provides an important
check on over-optimistic state assumptions in SIP drafting.
Default Provisions for Attainment Failure.-SIP failure to meet
the NAAQS by the statutory deadline constituted one of the most
serious deficiencies of the prior clean air laws. 161 The 1977 law
provided for no default mechanism and it was not clear what
would happen if attainment was not reached on time. 162 The
1990 Act responds to the deadline problem by establishing clear
procedural and substantive obligations that would accrue in the
event of SIP failure. These features seek to avoid the uncertainty
and policy confusion which characterized the 1980s. 163
First, the 1990 Act requires states to anticipate the possibility
of failure in the development of its SIP. Thus, every SIP must
contain non-attainment contingency measures which are automatically effective upon SIP failure and which reduce emissions by a
statutorily prescribed amount. 164
Second, the new legislation spells out the longer-term impli158. Id. § 102(d), 104 Stat. at 2417. (amending Clean Air Act§ 174, 42

u.s.c. 7504 (1988)).

159. See id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2426, 2427 (adding Clean Air Act
§§ 182(a)(1), 182(a)(3)).
160. Id., 104 Stat. at 2434-35 (adding Clean Air Act § 182(c)(4)).
161. See supra notes 58-59, 115-19 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
164. See 1990 Act, supra note 3, § 102, 104 Stat. at 2414-15 (amending
Clean Air Act § 172(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (1988) (nonattainment plan provisions in general)); id. § 104, 104 Stat. at 2454-55 (adding Clean Air Act
§ 187(a)(3) (for carbon monoxide)).
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cations of the failure to attain the NAAQS. Once again, the law
emphasizes automatic effect, leaving little room for negotiation
and delay. Upon failure to reach attainment in a timely fashion,
the area involved must be reclassified into the next most serious
non-attainment category-for instance, from serious to severe for
an ozone non-attainment area. 165 The effect of the reclassification would be to require within one year a SIP revision that imposes the attainment date and the enhanced control techniques
applicable to the new classification}66
In addition to this general SIP tightening, the Act demands
further annual, incremental emission reductions of five percent
until attainment is reached. 167 The Act also imposes automatic
penalties on individual polluters in the event attainment is not
reached. For example, in heavily-polluted ozone non-attainment
areas failing to attain, a financial penalty is placed upon VOC
sources even if they are in compliance with their SIP emission limitations. Each major stationary source ofVOC would be required
to pay an annual emissions fee of $5,000 per ton for certain
emissions. 168
Overall, these provisions reinforce the SIP program with a
self-correcting mechanism defined in explicit terms and kept
within the control of the statute. The drafters of these elements
attempted to maintain consistent pressure on the states to reduce
air pollution and to reach the attainment goal. Consequently, a
great deal of the EPA's discretion was sacrificed-the inevitable
result of the failure of prior collaborative schemes.
Direct Federal Authority to Compel Attainment.-In order to reach
attainment status by the statutory deadlines, the states and pollution sources must have the motivation to take the steps necessary
to reach the Clean Air Act's goal of healthy air. One of the most
significant problems in designing a national air pollution control
strategy is determining a collaborative structure that will involve
state and local governments in reaching federal objectives. The
strategy of the 1990 Act is to focus on shared environmental values and joint effort. Moreover, the Act seeks to enforce coopera165. See id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2424-25 (adding Clean Air Act§ 18l(b)(2)).
166. See, e.g., id. § 104, 104 Stat. at 2458 (adding Clean Air Act § 187(g)
(failure of serious area to attain standard for carbon monoxide)); id. § 105, 104
Stat. at 2462 (adding Clean Air Act § 189(d) (failure to attain PM-10 standard)).
167. Id. § 105, 104 Stat. at 2462 (adding Clean Air Act § 189(d)).
168. Id. § 103, 104 Stat. at 2450-51 (adding Clean Air Act § 185(a)-(b)).
The fee applies to all VOC emissions in excess of 80% of those allowed under
the SIP. Id. (adding Clean Air Act § 185(b)(l)).
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tion with the threat of federal regulatory takeover and the
imposition of sanctions.
The original justification for devising such an integrated system of air pollution control was, in part, political and functional,
for a completely federal system might not have been politically
attractive to legislators who foresaw the likely effect the Clean Air
Act would have on state regulation. Moreover, a joint federal/
state scheme of SIP preparation and implementation would give
the impression that state and local governments exert significant
control over a process designed to meet federal objectives with
limited federal bureaucratic intervention. Indeed, as a practical
matter the scheme allows state air program officials to serve as
proxies for the EPA and thereby expands its workforce.
To what extent may the EPA compel state and local government participation in the Clean Air Act program? 169 One answer
is to empower the EPA to assume the state's programmatic responsibilities. Thus, the 1990 Act retained the 1970 Clean Air
Act's provision for EPA intervention by allowing the EPA to develop a Federal Implementation Plan. 170 But because complete
federal takeover of the air quality planning process constitutes an
extreme form of state displacement in a supposedly cooperative
system of regulation, some alternative, intermediate authorityshort of total EPA domination-was needed to obtain the necessary state participation.
The 1990 Act's solution was to enforce its non-attainment
program through a series of sanctions designed to punish recalcitrant states for their lack of cooperation or failure. Specifically,
the new Act gives the EPA authority to impose a series of varied
sanctions whenever a state fails to perform in one of three ways:
(1) it fails to submit a SIP, or its submitted SIP fails to meet the
EPA's minimum criteria; (2) the EPA disapproves the state's SIP
submission in whole or in part or (3) the EPA "finds that any requirement of an approved SIP ... is not being implemented." 17 1
These three grounds focus both on the initial state responsibility
of submitting a complying SIP and the subsequent question of
inadequate implementation. If the EPA believes that any one of
these grounds exists and that the state is not making reasonable
169. The question assumes that satisfactory, voluntary cooperation from
these governments is not forthcoming.
170. See 1990 Act, supra note 3, § 102, 104 Stat. at 2422-23 (amending
Clean Air Act § 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1988)).
171. Id. § 102, 104 Stat. at 2420-21 (adding Clean Air Act § 179(a), 42
U.S.C. 7509(a)).
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efforts to cure the failure, it is under a statutory duty to apply at
least one sanction from a list of two provided by the Act: (1) a
limitation of the use of federal highway funds to specified projects
that will improve traffic safety or air quality; or (2) an expanded 2
to I emission offset requirement for new or modified sources
wishing to locate in the non-attainment area. 17 2
Each of these sanctions has a different potential impact. The
limitation on Department of Transportation grants would redirect federal funding from projects that adversely affect air quality
to those that reduce dependence upon automobile transportation
and encourage highway safety . 17 3 The expanded offset requirement would make new and modified source location more difficult to accomplish. In short, both sanctions serve to impress the
states with the significance of complying with the federal air quality control program. Moreover, having clearly enunciated and
statutorily mandated sanctions lessens the EPA's discretion in
their application. Mter all, Congress, not the EPA, imposes these
collaborative obligations on the states.
CONCLUSION
The Clean Air Act is designed to achieve a number of important environmental objectives. One of the most significant goals
is national attainment of clean and healthful air. By creating a
pre-set deadline to meet this objective, the drafters of the Clean
Air Act also have created a possibility of failure. Although Congress may select such a difficult social objective affecting so many
interests, it cannot force the nation to reach it in a timely fashion
by mere pronouncement. Rather, the public policy must be implemented through a complicated series of decisions and actions.
When Congress initially enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970,
its intent was to achieve the NAAQS in a statutorily defined, expeditious manner. In retrospect, however, it appears that the attainment policy was adopted on the basis of faulty or at least overlyoptimistic assumptions about the dimension of American air pollution, which have ultimately delayed attainment. However, these
unrealistic assumptions concerning the nature of the nation's air
172. See id., 104 Stat. at 2421-22 (adding §§ 179(b)(l)-(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7509(b)(l)-(2)).

173. In discussing congressional intent behind the sanctions policy of the
Senate bill S. 1630, the Senate Report only mentions the transportation grant
sanction. Instead of emphasizing the loss of federal funding, it stresses the redirection of such funds to beneficial purposes. See S. Rep. No. 228, lO 1st Con g.,
1st Sess. 26-28 (1989).
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pollution problem have obscured a more serious legislative failure. While the 1970 Act created the main structural elements of
the new federal air pollution control policy, it paid little attention
to implementation theory, or addressed it with overly optimistic
assumptions.
The drafters of the 1970 Act failed to understand and to confront adequately the conflict of interests between the federal and
state governments. They wrongly assumed that both levels of
government would share the same values and that effective cooperative action would be the norm. The EPA primarily was interested in air quality enhancement, and was charged with the major
responsibility of achieving public health and safety objectives,
while the states and localities were increasingly concerned with
the impact of environmental controls on their economic development, living patterns, and personal mobility. The conflict of
these potentially incompatible interests undercut the cooperative
ideal and ultimately created the wrong incentives for the states.
Indeed, the conflict may have tempted many states to underestimate the severity of their air quality problems and to overestimate
the impact of their solutions.
With the passage of the 1977 amendments, federal air pollution law entered into a second phase in which Congress recognized the need for greater non-attainment policy guidance and
enhanced the EPA's ability to ensure state compliance with the
non-attainment program. At the same time, however, congressional involvement in designing the planning and enforcement aspects of the non-attainment program increased markedly.
Congress replaced the original scheme of federal-state cooperation in air quality achievement with federal supervision of state
programs reinforced with fiscal and development sanctions. It
also used the EPA as its occasionally reluctant agent to coerce the
states. Nevertheless, the 1977 Act failed seriously to consider the
difficulty of designing a cooperative and effective system of air
quality attainment.
The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments represent a third stage
in intergovernmental relations. Congress retained the fundamental objective of NAAQS attainment and the basic strategy of relying upon SIPs, but introduced a model of congressional
programmatic micro-management and an unprecedented increase in detail. 174 By enacting a pollution control statute with
such specificity, and out of frustration with the nation's failure to
174. See supra notes 124-72 and accompanying text.
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achieve the NAAQS in a timely fashion, Congress has significantly
reduced the EPA's autonomy and state discretion. It avoided delegating authority to the EPA and instead established a largely
self-executing system in which the solutions to air quality control
problems are defined by Congress. In this way, the Clean Air Act
has transformed the idea of delegating discretionary agency authority into a system in which the EPA acts as a true legislative
"agent."
The final question to consider is whether the 1990 Clean Air
Act amendments and the resulting modification in federal/state
relationships are more likely to achieve air quality objectives than
prior legislation. The ultimate answer is undoubtedly speculative
and will depend upon a number of uncertain factors.
One factor involves whether the 1990 Act's implementation
process increases the likelihood that states, industries, and the
general public will take the necessary steps to reduce air emissions. For, despite the specificity and clarity of the implementation process and the possibility of EPA intervention, actual
attainment of the NAAQS will ultimately depend upon such important factors as political will and popular support. Put bluntly:
will the national environmental value of clean air be embraced by
all affected parties? A second factor concerns the extent to which
the state air pollution control agencies possess sufficient managerial and political skill-and commitment-to carry out the SIPs.
This factor is especially significant because many SIP provisions
have local impacts and may be initially unpopular. Consequently,
obtaining the firm and unwavering commitment of state and local
government to the Act's clean air goals will be indispensable.
"Foot dragging" on the part of state agencies will undoubtedly
convert any EPA cooperation into an adversarial position. State
recalcitrance could also trigger citizen suits, with the result being
judicial management of the attainment program. A third factor is
the durability of state and industry support for the Clean Air Act's
program during the implementation period. A corollary to this
factor is the extent to which the courts should be neutral or supportive when aspects of the clean air program are challenged. A
final consideration concerns the stability of the Clean Air Act's
emphasis on uniform NAAQS attainment, and whether such a
policy will be undermined in the future by competing public policies or changes in underlying economic or social conditions. The
1990 Act recognizes that achieving air quality goals will take many
years and require stable popular and legislative support at both
state and federal levels of government.
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Time will tell whether the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air
Act achieve the results Congress intended. While federal-state interaction has been retained, however, Congress modified the
original idea of cooperative federalism with respect to air pollution control into a new cooperative federalism ·with precise rules.
Possibly to design clear performance objectives, the new system
has defined a process of non-attainment planning and enforcement containing sequential steps with pre-determined stages.
While this process might be criticized for eliminating flexibility, it
at least expressed clearer congressional expectations. In an
ironic way, this should remove pressure from both the EPA and
the states, for the locally unattractive performance goals have
been set from above by Congress. Moreover, this programmatic
development mandated by the Act may actually create more of a
technical role for the EPA--one of evaluating compliance with
statutorily created standards.
The history of the Clean Air Act reveals both the difficulty in
reaching the Act's attainment goal and the delicacy of the federalstate relationship. Although the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments
have given greater attention to implementation questions, we can
hope that Congress has found the correct balance to ensure that
air will be clean throughout the nation. If this elusive goal is
achieved, we will have gained much in our ability to develop cooperative, intergovernmental systems to attain complex social
objectives. In the end, this achievement may be as great as the
environmental clean air goals themselves.

